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Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 459G – application to set aside statutory demand – 
manner of service - meaning of “on the person who served the demand on the 
company”  
 
The application before the court in Millerview Constructions Pty Ltd v Palmer 
Plumbing Pty Ltd [2008] QSC 005 raised a significant question regarding the 
appropriate construction of s 459G of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) (the Act). The 
decision emphasises the importance of ensuring that any application to set aside a 
statutory demand must be served in a timely way on the creditor at the creditor’s 
address for service as stated in the statutory demand, or in strict compliance with 
another manner authorised by the Act. 
 
Facts 
 
By notice dated 13 November 2007 Palmer Plumbing (the creditor) required payment 
by Millerview Contructions Pty Ltd (the company) of an amount of approximately 
$19,000.00 for which the creditor had obtained a default judgment against the 
company. There was conflicting evidence about the date the demand was served, but 
it appeared it was received at the company’s registered office on 16 November 2007, 
and at the office of the company’s sole director and secretary on 19 November 2007.  
 
In the statutory demand the creditor gave its address for service as care of its solicitors 
and it provided the street address of those solicitors in Maroochydore. 
 
The company purported to serve an application for an order setting aside the statutory 
demand and supporting affidavit – 
(a) by facsimile sent to the creditor’s solicitors on 4 December 2007; and 
(b) by sending it by prepaid express post to the creditor’s solicitors at their post 
office box on 5 December 2007. 
 
There was no evidence that either of these methods was effective in bringing the 
process to the notice of the creditor within 21 days of the service of the demand. The 
only acknowledgment of the purported service was a letter from the creditor’s 
solicitors dated 17 December 2007, in which they asserted that the process had not 
been validly served. 
 
When the application to set aside the statutory demand came before the Court the 
threshold question was whether the application had been validly served. 
 
Legislation 
 
Section 459G of the Act provides: 
 
Company may apply 
 
(1) A company may apply to the Court for an order setting aside a statutory 
demand served on the company. 
(2) An application may only be made within 21 days after the demand is so 
served. 
(3) An application is made in accordance with this section only if, within 
those 21 days: 
(a) an affidavit supporting the application is filed with the Court; and 
(b) a copy of the application, and a copy of the supporting affidavit, 
are served on the person who served the demand on the company. 
 
Analysis 
 
Wilson J said that the Court did not have jurisdiction to set the statutory demand aside 
unless copies of the application and supporting affidavit are served on the person who 
made the demand within 21 days after service of the demand, and that there was no 
power in the Court to extend that time: David Grant & Co Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking 
Corporation (1995) 184 CLR 265. 
 
The judge then considered what was meant by “on the person who served the demand 
on the company” in s 459G(3)(b) of the Act. She said this was a reference to the 
creditor who was the person who was entitled to serve the demand under s 459E, and 
that the subsection did not refer to the process server or other person who actually 
served the demand, nor to the solicitor who caused it to be served. In that regard she 
adopted what has been said on that question by Byrne J of the Victorian Supreme 
Court in re Marlan Financial Services Pty Ltd (1999) 33 ACSR 259, [12].  
 
It was then necessary to determine whether the creditor had been served in the 
circumstances before the Court. Referring to the views of Young J in Howship 
Holdings Pty Ltd v Leslie (1996) 41 NSWLR 542 Wilson J said that s 459G does not 
deal with what constitutes service, but that what was required was that the process 
comes to the notice of the creditor within the 21 days. 
 
Wilson J noted that although the creditor was a company and that s 109X of the Act 
(service of documents) could have been invoked, none of the methods set out in that 
section had been employed.  
 
Her Honour also noted that the form prescribed for the statutory demand, form 509H, 
requires the creditor to state an address for service, and said that timely service at that 
address would satisfy s 459G(3). She accepted that other methods of service, such as 
by facsimile, may suffice, provided the documents actually come to the notice of the 
creditor within time.  
 
On the facts at hand, the judge concluded that service had not been effected at the 
address for the creditor as shown in the statutory demand, and that there was no 
evidence that either of the means adopted by the company was effective in bringing 
the process to the notice of the creditor within 21 days of the service of the demand. 
 
Counsel for the company submitted that the Court should retrospectively authorise 
service by transmission to the solicitors’ facsimile number and/or at their post office 
box under s 109X(6) of the Act. (That subsection makes it clear that s 109X does not 
affect the power of a court to authorise a document to be served in a manner other 
than those specified in s 109X.)  
 
Wilson J said that even if there were circumstances in which a mode of service may 
be retrospectively authorised under the section (which she found it unnecessary to 
decide) the case at hand was not one of them.  
 
Corporations Referring to Rochester Communications Group Pty Ltd v Lader Pty Ltd 
(1997) 143 ALR 648 and Austar Finance Group Pty Ltd v Campbell [2007] NSWSC 
1493, [65]-[71], she held that the Court’s jurisdiction to set aside the statutory demand 
was dependent on service of the process within 21 days after the demand was served, 
and that purported authorisation outside that period would be beyond the jurisdiction 
of the court. 
 
Order 
 
Consistent with the conclusion that the company had filed to prove that the process 
was served on the creditor within 21 days of the service of the demand, the order was 
that the application be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. 
 
 
